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September 30, 1992
Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

Letter of Correction for State v.
William Horton, No. 920245-CA

Dear Ms. Noonan:
The State filed its brief in the above named case last
week. A colleague, Mr. David B. Thompson, recently read my brief
and noticed that I made a mistake in paragraph 5 of the standard
of review section. That paragraph now reads:
5. Did the trial court properly refuse
to admit into evidence defendant's proposed
exhibit number 24, a photograph of the trunk
of defendant's wife's vehicle, which was used
to transport the stolen property in various
burglaries? A trial court's decision to
admit or not admit evidence will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3.
(Br. of the State at 2-3) (emphasis added).
The last sentence of paragraph 5 should read:
A trial court's decision to admit or not
admit evidence is reviewed under a correction
of error standard. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781
n.3.
I request that the Court be made aware of my mistake
and this letter of correction. I also apologize for any
confusion my mistake may have caused the Court or opposing
counsel.
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I have sent a copy of this letter to defendant's
attorney, Alan M. Williams.
Respectfully submitted,

TODD A. UTZIKBSER^
Assistant Attorney General

cc. Alan M. Williams
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 920245-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 2

WILLIAM GENE HORTON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the Eighth Judicial District
Court in and for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable A.
Lynn Payne, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the affidavit in support of the search warrant

establish probable cause?

When a search warrant is challenged as

having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause,
the reviewing court does not conduct a de novo review of the
magistrate's probable cause determination; instead, the reviewing
court determines only whether the magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed.
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989).

State v,

See also State v.

Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991) (reviewing court
should pay "great deference" to the magistrate's decision),
2.

Assuming the search warrant was technically

defective, did the trial court properly admit the evidence seized
from defendant's residence on the basis that the officers who
conducted the search reasonably relied on that warrant?

This

Court will review de novo the question of whether an officer
acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant.

State v. Rowe,

806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991).
3.

Did the trial court properly refuse to admit into

evidence the affidavit of Harmon Meinhart, a deceased witness who
would have testified on behalf of defendant?

This Court reviews

a trial judge's decision to exclude evidence at trials under an
correction of error standard.

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,

781 n.3 (Utah 1991) ("Whether a piece of evidence is admissible
is a question of law, and we always review questions of law under
a correctness standard.").
4.

Did the trial court properly refuse to grant

defendant's motion to continue the trial until one of defendant's
witnesses, Clara Eva Meinhart, would be available to testify in
person instead of by deposition?

The decision whether to grant

or deny a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that
discretion.
5.

State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991).
Did the trial court properly refuse to admit into

evidence defendant's proposed exhibit number 24, a photograph of
the trunk of defendant's wife's vehicle, which was used to
transport the property stolen in various burglaries?
2

A trial

court's decision to admit or not admit evidence will not be
reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.

Ramirez, 817

P.2d at 781 n.3.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules for a determination of this case are included in the text
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with multiple
counts of theft and burglary stemming from the burglaries of
several businesses located in the area of Vernal/ Utah (R. 2-4).
The original information charged defendant as follows:
Count I, Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990);
Count II, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1990);
Count III, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990);
Count IV, Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990);
Count V, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990);
Count VI, Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1990);
Count VII, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990);
3

Count VIII, Theft, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990);
Count IX, Burglary of a Non-Dwelling, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990); and
Count X, Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (R. 2-4).
Following a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound
over for trial on all counts, except that count one, which also
had alleged that defendant was a habitual criminal, was amended
to delete that charge. Also, count six was amended to reflect a
charge of theft, a class B misdemeanor.
After defendant was arraigned, counts one and two,
which involved a burglary at a "Wilkerson's" store in Duchesne
County, were severed from counts three through ten, which
involved burglaries that occurred at other locations on a
different date.

Separate trials were then scheduled.

In the

first trial, defendant was acquitted on counts one and two.
Consequently, this appeal does not involve the charges alleged in
counts one and two of the information.
At the trial on counts three through ten, a mistrial
was declared.

Trial was re-scheduled, but was continued because

one of defendant's alibi witnesses underwent surgery and was
unavailable to testify.

Defendant moved for an additional

continuance based on the claim that his witness needed additional
time to recover from her surgery (R. 165-67J.

The trial court

refused to grant a further continuance and ordered that the
4

witness be deposed and her testimony read to the jury at trial
(R. 168). A trial was then held on counts three through ten, and
a jury convicted defendant on all counts as charged.

The trial

court sentenced defendant to one term of one to fifteen years and
six terms of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison, the
sentences to run consecutively.

Defendant was also sentenced to

one term of zero to six months at the Utah State Prison, that
sentence to run concurrently with defendant's other sentences (R.
291-93).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
During the night of Father's Day, Sunday, June 16,
1991, or in the early morning hours of June 17th, defendant and
Brian Winslow, his accomplice and codefendant, burglarized the
Money Savers store in Maeser, Utah, near Vernal (R. 826-27).
Defendant and Winslow entered the building by pushing in an air
conditioning unit that was installed in the wall, and then
crawling through the hole (R. 826, 1022).

The two took several

cartons of popular-brand cigarettes, packages of meat, and other
assorted items (R. 831-34, 839-42, 1023-25).
On the same night or early morning, defendant and
Winslow also broke into the Dinah Bowl building.

The Dinah Bowl

building houses three separate businesses, all of which were
burglarized (R. 319, 847, 860, 870). Defendant and Winslow
entered the Dinah Bowl building from the roof by removing a
1

The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah
1989); see also State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 1989).
5

nailed sheet of plywood that covered an old air conditioning
hole, and then entering through the hole (R. 338, 1029).

From

the Dinah Bowl bowling alley, defendant and Winslow stole a grey
Denver Broncos bag used for carrying a bowling ball and other
items (R. 368). From the Acute Cut beauty salon, defendant and
Winslow took leather purses and other items (R. 1034-45).

And

from the Dinah Barber Salon defendant and Winslow took some
scissors and petty cash (R. 395). In addition to stealing
assorted property, defendant threw a bowling ball through a glass
door and generally destroyed property in the Acute Cut salon (R.
860, 900, 1034).
Detective Joe Boren of the Vernal City Police
department investigated the Dinah Bowl burglary the next morning
(R. 318-19, 895). He videotaped the crime scene and recovered
two distinct shoe patterns in the area below the suspected point
of entry from the roof (R. 897-899).

Boren inspected the plywood

that was originally nailed over the old air conditioning hole.
He did not believe that defendant and Winslow could get the
plywood up without the use of tools (R. 901). Boren did not
detect any usable fingerprints; however, burglars often use
gloves and therefore do not leave prints (R. 903, 1027).
During the course of his investigation of the Dinah
Bowl burglaries, Boren checked with Detective Wayne Hollebeke of
the Uintah County Sheriff's office to determine if any crimes
Hollebeke was investigating had the same modus operandi
Dinah Bowl burglary (R. 325-26).

as the

The two officers determined
6

that there were several similarities between two burglaries of
Money Savers that occurred on May 26, 1991 and June 16, 1991,
and the June 16th burglary of the Dinah Bowl.

The similarities

included the method of entry, the time of occurrence (both over
holiday weekends), the targets were all businesses, the
footprints taken from the Money Savers burglary appeared to match
those footprints found in the bowling alley, and more than one
person was involved in each burglary (R. 323, 521, 654, 658).
On the morning of July 8, 1991, Boren received a phone
call at his office in the police department from an informant
(Search Warrant Affidavit at 4, hereinafter, "Aff." ). 2

The

caller identified him or herself by name, but requested that his
or her identity remain confidential (jLd.; R. 638-39).

The

informant asked whether there had been a recent burglary at a
bowling alley in Vernal.

Boren confirmed that there had been.

The caller next asked whether there had been a burglary in
Duchesne in which VCR's were taken.

Boren replied that he did

not know, and that he would have to find out (R. 640). The
caller then informed Boren that he or she overheard a
conversation between William and Vickie Horton in which defendant
mentioned that some VCR's were taken out of a business in
Duchesne, and that he, the defendant, had broken into the bowling

2

The State filed a motion to have the search warrant
affidavit made part of the record on appeal. As of the time of
filing, however, the State's motion had not yet been ruled upon.
Nevertheless, a copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as
Addendum A. The page numbering on the affidavit was added by the
State for ease of reference.

7

alley in Vernal (Aff. at 5).

The caller told Boren defendant's

approximate age, exact address in Salt Lake City, a description
of the car used in the burglaries, as well as its license plate
number, and that defendant had a criminal record (id.. ).
After the conversation with the informant, Boren called
the Duchesne County Sheriff's office and spoke with Rick Harris.
Harris told Boren that the Wilkerson store in Duchesne had been
burglarized and some VCR's were stolen (id.)*

Boren also

verified defendant's address and criminal record (Aff. at 6).
At about 1:00 p.m., the informant called again.

This

time the informant stated that "the suspect had been in
possession of several boxes of video tapes, Nintendo games, some
VCR's and several boxes of packaged meat" (id..).

The informant

also stated that defendant "had been selling lots of cartons of
Marlboro cigarettes" (.id.)*

The informant stated that a person

from Vernal may have been involved in the burglaries, and that he
or she would call back if he or she were able to obtain more
information (id..).
At about 4:00 p.m. on the same day, the informant
called a third time and told Boren that the name of the person
from Vernal who may have committed the crimes with defendant was
"Steven."

(Aff. at 6). The informant also stated that "Steven"

lived in Vernal and had been in prison with defendant.

The

caller described "Steven" as blonde, stocky build, married, and
having one child (id.).
At about 10:30 p.m., the informant called Boren at his
8

residence.

The informant stated that the person in Vernal was

named "Brian," not Steven.

The informant further stated that

Brian had been released from prison just six months ago (Aff. at
7).
At some point during these conversation, the informant
told Boren that he or she saw defendant in the driveway of
defendant's home trying to sell stolen cigarettes to defendant's
father-in-law.

The informant also said that he or she watched as

"packaged meats [were] taken into the house" (R. 642-43).
The next day, July 9th, Boren contacted Brent Cardall
of the Department of Corrections.

Cardall reported that he had

only two people with the first name of Brian listed in his
office; one in California and Brian Winslow in Vernal.

Cardall

described Winslow as blonde, stocky build, married, and having
one child approximately six months old (R. 286).
Using the information provided by the caller, Boren
prepared an affidavit to request a search warrant for defendant's
residence.

At the time, Boren knew the informant did not want to

be identified because of fear of retaliation from defendant.
Consequently, Boren omitted some of the detailed information that
the informant had provided him so that defendant would be unable
to discern the informant's identity (R. 290).
When Officer Boren arrived in Salt Lake on the morning
of July 10th, the Salt Lake County Attorney's office reviewed the
search warrant affidavit before allowing Boren to present it to a
magistrate (R. 645). After reading the affidavit, the magistrate
9

issued the requested search warrant (.id.)*

Boren, accompanied by

other officers, executed the search at defendant's residence.
There they recovered several items that had been stolen from the
Dinah Bowl and the Acute Cut, including two towels with the words
"Dinah Bowl" and a picture of a dinosaur on them (R. 323, 90607), a grey Denver Broncos bowling ball bag (R. 322), several
leather purses and other items (R. 325, 1034-35).
The police also found a blue nylon gym bag, a green
army duffel bag and a nylon feed bag that contained bolt cutters,
a nylon rope with a knot tied every foot to foot and one half,
two crowbars, plastic gloves, a flashlight, large screwdrivers, a
20 pound sledgehammer and pipe cutters.

Boren testified that he

and the other officers believed that the items were burglary
tools (R. 427-29, 676-80, 910-11).
At trial, Brian Winslow testified for the State.
Winslow stated that defendant and defendant's wife were at his
residence in Vernal waiting for him when he arrived home from
work at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. on June 16th (R. 1019).

According to

Winslow, he and defendant burglarized Money Savers and the Dinah
Bowl businesses on the night of June 16, 1991 (R. 1020-26, 102930).

Winslow also testified that defendant carried his burglary

tools in a bag, and that both he and defendant wore gloves during
the burglary (R. 1027-28).
Winslow's wife also testified that defendant and his
wife arrived at the Winslow residence in Vernal on June 16, 1991,
at about 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. (R. 1086-87).
10

Defendant attempted to rebut Winslow's testimony by
producing four alibi witnesses.

Jay Bringhurst, a friend of

defendant, Vickie Horton, defendant's wife, and Rachelle Schow,
defendant's stepdaughter, all testified that they spent the day
together in East Canyon and returned to Salt Lake at about 10:00
or 11:00 p.m. (R. 1110-12, 1120-21, 1134-35).

Mrs. Meinhart,

defendant's mother-in-law, whose home is adjacent to defendant's
home, testified in a deposition that she saw defendant and his
wife in Salt Lake City at about 10:30 p.m. on June 16th (R. 1143,
1150, 1153).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant because
the supporting affidavit established probable cause.

Even if the

warrant were deemed defective, the trial court properly admitted
the evidence seized at defendant's residence because Detective
Boren reasonably relied on the warrant when searching defendant's
residence.
The trial court did not err when it refused to admit
the affidavit of Harmon Meinhart under the residual hearsay
exception.

Defendant sought its admission to establish an alibi.

However, defendant also presented similar testimony from four
other alibi witnesses.

Consequently, the affidavit was

inadmissible under rule 804(b)(5) Utah Rules of Evidence, because
it was not more probative on the point for which it was offered
than any other evidence that defendant could procure.
11

Similarly, the trial court did not err by refusing to
admit the photograph of the trunk of the vehicle allegedly used
to transport the stolen property.

The photograph was taken by

defendant's wife and contained no verifiable scale of
measurement.

Defendant claimed that a hubcap that was propped up

inside the trunk was fourteen inches in diameter.

However,

because the bottom portion of the hubcap was not visible in the
photograph, it was impossible to verify whether it was resting on
the floor of the trunk or on some other object inside the trunk.
Under the circumstances, the reliability of the photograph was
dubious, and the trial court properly refused to admit the
photograph into evidence.
Also, the trial court acted well within its discretion
when it refused to grant defendant's motion for a continuance
based on his claim that an alibi witness would be unavailable for
trial.

Specifically, defendant asserted that his mother-in-law,

Clara Eva Meinhart, was scheduled to undergo surgery at the time
of trial.

Defendant provided a letter from Meinhart's physician

in which her physician indicated that Meinhart would need "a
recovery time of eight weeks due to the delicate nature of this
surgery" and "a complete recovery time of a period of six months"
(R. 167). Given the uncertainty in how long it would take
Meinhart to sufficiently recover, and the length of the delay,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
defendant's motion.

At any rate, the witness was deposed and her

testimony was read to the jury.

Consequently, even if the court
12

abused its discretion by refusing to continue defendant's trial,
that error was harmless.
Finally, the trial court did violate Utah Code Ann.
S 76-3-401 (1990) by sentencing defendant to consecutive terms of
imprisonment that totalled more than thirty years. As this Court
made clear in State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115 (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), § 76-3-401 does not prohibit
the imposition of such a sentence, it merely limits the number of
years served to no more than thirty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY REVIEWING THE SEARCH WARRANT AND ITS
ACCOMPANYING AFFIDAVIT DE NOVO, THE TRIAL
COURT FAILED TO "PAY GREAT DEFERENCE" TO THE
ISSUING MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF PROBABLE
CAUSE. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULING ON THIS POINT AND UPHOLD THE
MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
The trial court erred when it concluded that the
affidavit supporting the request for a search warrant failed to
establish probable cause.

(A copy of the trial court's findings

of fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum B.)
More specifically, the trial court appears to have conducted a de
novo review of the affidavit, and, in so doing, it failed to pay
appropriate deference to the magistrate's probable cause
determination.

As demonstrated below, when reviewed with the

proper degree of deference, the magistrate's probable cause
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determination should be upheld.3
It is well-established that a magistrate's probable
cause determination is deferentially reviewed, and reversed only
if it is clearly erroneous; that is, only if it had no
"substantial basis."

State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 990-91

(Utah 1989); State v. Purser, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29-30 (Utah
App. March 11, 1992).

Accord United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897, 914-15, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416 (1984).

See also State v.

Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991) ("In reviewing the
magistrate's determination of the sufficiency of the affidavit,
we are obliged to pay great deference to the finding of probable
cause and we do not make a de novo review.") (citations omitted).
Stated differently,
[w]hen an issue is raised . . . as to whether
an affidavit contains sufficient facts to
find probable cause for issuance of a search
warrant, the reviewing court is not required
to conduct a de novo review of the
magistrate's determination. The reviewing
court need only determine whether the issuing
magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding that there were enough facts
within the affidavit to find that probable
cause existed. It is within a magistrate's
discretion to construe ambiguity within an
affidavit.
State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885-86 (Utah App.), cert, denied.
3

Although the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress based on the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any
proper ground. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985)
("[T]his Court may affirm the trial court's decision on any
proper grounds, even though the trial court assigned another
reason for its ruling."). Consequently, the State reasserts its
argument advanced below that the affidavit, reviewed under the
appropriate standard, established probable cause.
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817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted).
Moreover, the existence of probable cause is determined
based on the totality of the circumstances.

Leon, 468 U.S. at

914-15, 104 S. Ct. at 3416; Weaver, 817 P.2d at 832. Under the
totality of the circumstances analysis, the magistrate must
make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all of the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including
the "veracity" and basis of knowledge of
persons supplying hearsay information, there
is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.
Weaver, 817 P.2d at 832-33 (citations omitted).

See also United

States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Probable
cause is nothing more than a reasonable belief that the evidence
sought is located at the place indicated by the policeman's
affidavit.") (quoted with approval in Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833).
As such, the question that the issuing magistrate had
to address was whether the affidavit, read as a whole,
demonstrated a reasonable belief that the evidence sought was
located at defendant's residence.

The State concedes on appeal,

as it did below, that there is no express statement in the
affidavit that the informant saw the stolen property at
defendant's residence.

However, a common-sense reading of the

affidavit as a whole, allowing for the magistrate's discretion to
construe ambiguities in the affidavit, supports its finding of
probable cause.

This is especially true when the magistrate's

probable cause determination is deferentially reviewed, instead
of being reviewed de novo as the trial court appears to have done
15

in this case.
According to the affidavit, Boren received a telephone
call from an informant who wished to remain anonymous out of fear
of retaliation.

The caller stated that he or she had overheard a

conversation between defendant and defendant's wife in which the
defendant said that he had broken into the Vernal Bowling Alley
as well as something about VCR's taken from a business in
Duchesne.

The caller also provided detailed information about

defendant —

his approximate agef criminal history, the make and

model of the car that was used in the burglaries and its license
plate, and defendant's address.
Boren corroborated all of the information provided by
the caller through independent investigation.

Later that same

day, the informant called Boren and reported that defendant
had been in possession of several boxes of videotapes, Nintendo
games, some VCR's and several boxes of packaged meat.

The caller

also stated defendant "had been selling lots of cartons of
Marlboro cigarettes" (Aff. at 6).

All of these items matched

descriptions of items stolen in the recent burglaries in Vernal
and Duchesne identified by the informant.
Given the quantity of stolen property itemized by Boren
in the affidavit4 and the nature of those materials

—

especially the packaged meat and other food items, as well as the
A

As a review of the affidavit indicates, Det. Boren
carefully itemized the stolen items, even going so far as to
identify individual videotapes and Nintendo games by their titles
and providing the probable packaging dates on the packaged meats
(Aff. at 2-4).
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fact that the only address in the warrant was that of defendant's
residence as provided by the informant, it was reasonable for the
magistrate to infer that the informant's observations had been of
defendant at his residence.

The trial court recognized this

possible interpretation of the affidavit, but countered that
because the affidavit was ambiguous, it was also possible to
infer that the stolen property was being distributed from
defendant's vehicle (R. 630). However, as the State argued
below,
The only mention of selling of items were
cartons of cigarettes. The rest was just in
possession, including VCR's. Again, common
sense [indicates that] people don't keep
VCR's, . . . several packages of meat, [and]
Nintendo games [in their cars]. These are
items that are routinely kept at home. And I
would submit that reading it that way is a
reasonable conclusion that the magistrate had
a substantial basis to conclude that the
items were at the property, were at the
residence provided, and that the informant —
the informant, by supplying the residence,
also supplied the location the property would
be found. Therefore, it's the State's
position that in reading this affidavit as a
whole, it's the only conclusion the
magistrate could have arrived at and,
therefore, was just in granting a search
warrant for the home.
(R. 630-31).
Whether the affidavit in the instant case was
sufficient to establish probable cause to search defendant's
house is, as were similar issues in Babbell and Collard, a very
close question.

However, under the totality of the

circumstances, the issuing magistrate could have reasonably
determined that there was "a fair probability" that the evidence
17

sought was at defendant's residence.
While the affidavit could have been more artfully
drafted, see Babbell, 770 P.2d at 992 n.3, a reviewing court must
consider an affidavit "'in its entirety and in a common-sense
fashion,'" id. at 991 (quoting State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099,
1102 (Utah 1985)), and recognize that "affidavits 'are normally
drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal
investigation5 [and that] [t]echnical requirements of elaborate
specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no
proper place in this area.'"

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 233,

235 (1983) (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108
(1965)).

As also stated in Gates:
[W]e have repeatedly said that afterthe-fact scrutiny by courts of the
sufficiency of the affidavit should not take
the form of de novo review. A magistrate's
"determination of probable cause should be
paid great deference by reviewing courts."
Spinelli Tv. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
419, 89 S. Ct. 584, 590 (1969)]. "A grudging
or negative attitude by reviewing courts
toward warrants," Ventresca, 380 U.S., at
108, is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment's strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant; "courts
should not invalidate warrantfs] by
interpreting affidavitfs] in a
hypertechnical, rather than commonsense

5

Indeed, in this case, Boren prepared the affidavit between
the hours of 10 p.m. and 2 a.m. while other officers maintained
surveillance on Winslow's house and the Money Savers store in
Maeser, Utah. At the same time, three or four other officers
went back and forth from the surveillance scenes as additional
information was gathered for other affidavits. Boren wanted to
serve the warrant as soon as possible the next day and planned to
go to Salt Lake City to try to get the warrant issued. He did
not request either a nighttime search or no-knock authorization
(R. 643-44, 655).
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manner."

Jjd., at 109 .

We also have said that "[a]lthough in a
particular case it may not be easy to
determine when an affidavit demonstrates the
existence of probable cause, the resolution
of doubtful or marginal cases in this area
should be largely determined by the
preference to be accorded to warrants,,f
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109
(1985). This reflects both a cissire to
encourage use of the warrant process by
police officers and a recognition that once a
warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment
is less severe than otherwise may be the
case.
462 U.S. at 236, 237 n. 10. See also Babbell, 770 P.2d at 99091; Collard, 810 P.2d at 886; Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833 (adopting
same considerations)•
Although admittedly a very close question, the issuing
magistrate reasonably found that the affidavit established
probable cause.

By refusing to construe the ambiguous statements

in the affidavit in keeping with the magistrate's finding of
probable cause, the trial court effectively reviewed the
magistrate's probable cause finding de novo.
should not have engaged in that analysis.

The trial court

Rather, given that the

trial court recognized that the magistrate could have construed
the affidavit in the manner suggested by the State, it should
have deferred to the magistrate's finding of probable cause. Had
the trial court paid the magistrate's determination of probable
cause the great deference it was due pursuant to both federal and
Utah precedent, it would have upheld that determination.
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This

Court should therefore uphold the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress, but on the ground that the
affidavit did establish probable cause.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS DEFECTIVE, THE
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE
SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE BECAUSE
DETECTIVE BOREN'S RELIANCE ON THE WARRANT WAS
REASONABLE.
Even if this Court were to determine that the affidavit
did not provide the magistrate with an adequate basis for
determining that probable cause existed, the trial court properly
admitted the evidence seized under the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984)-

In reviewing a trial court's

determination of good faith reliance, this Court conducts a de
novo review.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App.), cert.

granted, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991).

As demonstrated belowf the

trial court correctly determined that Boren's reliance on the
warrant was reasonable.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States
Supreme Court held that federal constitutional guarantees against
unlawful search and seizure required exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence in state criminal trials. However, in Leon the
Court carved out a "good faith" exception to that exclusionary
rule,

,f

hold[ing] that evidence obtained in violation of the

Fourth Amendment by officers acting in objectively reasonable
reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached
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magistrate need not be excluded, as a matter of federal law, from
the case in chief of federal and state criminal prosecutions."
Leon, 468 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring).6
In Leon, the Court stated:
We conclude that the marginal or
nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing
evidence obtained in objectively reasonable
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search
warrant cannot justify the substantial costs
of exclusion. We do not suggest, however,
that exclusion is always inappropriate in
cases where an officer has obtained a warrant
and abided by its terms. "[S]earches
6

Defendant purports to base his claim on both the federal
and state constitution. However, defendant did not properly
develop a state constitutional argument below. Indeed, defendant
concedes that the applicability of the "good faith" exception
under the Utah Constitution was not briefed before the trial
court, but asserts that it was "discussed in open court and
presumably was considered in the trial court's decision." (Br.
of Appellant at 12) Defendant's assertion is incorrect. The
only discussion about whether the good faith exception was
applicable under the Utah Constitution centered around the fact
that the issue had yet to be addressed by either this Court or
the Utah Supreme Court (R. 634-46). Despite the trial court's
assertion the issue was unsettled, defendant never attempted to
explain why a different standard should be adopted under the Utah
Constitution than that provided under the Fourth Amendment.
Consequently, defendant's state constitutional argument was not
properly preserved below and should not be addressed for the
first time on appeal. State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah
App. 1991) ("Even though the Utah Constitution is subject to
independent analysis, argument for such interpretation generally
should begin in the trial court."). See also. State v. Miller,
829 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268,
1273 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28
(Utah App. 1989) (same position as Buford).
Moreover, even on appeal, defendant has failed to
develop a distinct state constitutional analysis. This Court
should therefore consider defendant's claim based solely on
federal grounds. See State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 n.2
(Utah App. 1991) (Utah appellate courts "will not engage in a
state constitutional analysis unless a party briefs a different
analysis under the state constitution than that which flows from
the federal Constitution."); State v. Barela, 779 P.2d 1140, 1142
n.l (Utah App. 1989).
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pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any
deep inquiry into reasonableness," Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S., at 267 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment), for "a warrant
issued by a magistrate normally suffices to
establish" that a law enforcement officer has
"acted in good faith in conducting the
search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 823, n.32 (1982). Nevertheless, the
officer's reliance on the magistrate's
probable-cause determination and on the
technical sufficiency of the warrant he
issues must be objectively reasonable, cf.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19
(1982), and it is clear that in some
circumstances the officer will have no
reasonable grounds for believing that the
warrant was properly issued.
Suppression therefore remains an
appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge
in issuing a warrant was misled by
information in an affidavit that the affiant
knew was false or would have known was false
except for his reckless disregard of the
truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
(1978). The exception we recognize today
will also not apply in cases where the
issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his
judicial role in the manner condemned in LoJi Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319
(1979); in such circumstances, no reasonably
well trained officer should rely on the
warrant. Nor would an officer manifest
objective good faith in relying on a warrant
based on an affidavit "so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official
belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
at 610-611 (Powell, J., concurring in part);
see Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 263-364
(White, J., concurring in judgment).
Finally, depending on the circumstances of
the particular case, a warrant may be so
facially deficient—i.e., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the
things to be seized—that the executing
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be
valid. Cf. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, post,
at 988-991.
468 U.S. at 922-23 (footnotes omitted).
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The Leon good faith exception applies directly to this
case.

If Det. Boren's supporting affidavit was technically

insufficient because it failed to indicate more precisely the
reasons for believing that the stolen property was at defendant's
residence, it was not so inadequate that the officers could not
have acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the search
warrant that was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.
None of the circumstances that the Supreme Court
teaches would negate objective good faith are extant in this
case.

This is not a case in which the issuing magistrate was

misled by knowingly or recklessly false information in an
affidavitr or where the magistrate wholly abandoned his role as a
neutral and detached judicial officer, or where the affidavit was
"so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the
official belief in it existence entirely unreasonable."
468 U.S. at 922-23.

Leon,

Cf. State v. Dronenburq, 781 P.2d 1303, 1305

(Utah App. 1989) (where the supporting affidavit was "so lacking
in indicia of probable cause" that the State conceded "it was
unreasonable for the officer who prepared the affidavit to rely
on a warrant issued on the strength of it"); Rowe, 806 P.2d 730
(search warrant held invalid where officer requested
authorization for nighttime search merely by placing an "X" in a
box on a standardized form but provided no facts whatsoever to
justify request).

Quite the contrary, Boren prepared a very

detailed affidavit which, in hindsight, could have and should
have more precisely stated the basis for believing that the
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stolen property was located at defendant's residence•
Although Boren could have provided more details in his
affidavit about the information he received from the informant,
and thereby could have clearly established probable cause, Boren
withheld that information in an effort to protect the informant's
identity.

Police reliance on informants is a well known fact of

law enforcement.

1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A

Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 3.3(g) at 698 (2d ed. 1987).
Further, if informants do not believe that the police will
protect their identity once they provide information regarding
criminal activity, the number of concerned citizens that are
willing to come forward with information will surely decrease.
Id.

Therefore, protection of the identity of informants is an

important policy and a serious concern to law enforcement
officials.
Because the informant feared retaliation from
defendant, he or she asked Boren to keep his or her identity
confidential.

Boren respected that request, and he cautiously

excluded from his affidavit specific information that would have
jeopardized the confidentiality of the informant's identity (R.
644).

Boren was not trying to mislead the magistrate.

Rather,

as he indicated in his testimony, Boren recognized that as the
amount of detailed information he provided in the affidavit
increased, so did the likelihood that defendant would be able to
discern the identity of the informant (R. 643-45).

Boren had to

strike a balance between providing enough information to
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establish probable cause and the need to protect his informant
from retribution.

As such, Boren risked having a neutral and

detached magistrate refuse to issue a search warrant in return
for protecting the identity of his informant as best he could.
In this admittedly close case, the magistrate decided
to issue the warrant.

Should this Court find that the affidavit

was defective because of its lack of specificity as to the
location of the stolen property, it should nevertheless uphold
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. The
defect in the affidavit is not so obvious that the officers "had
no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly
issued."

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.

Consequently, Boren's reliance

on the warrant issued was objectively reasonable, and the
deterrent purpose of the federal exclusionary rule would not be
served by excluding the challenged evidence under the facts of
this case.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY EXCLUDED THE
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT'S DECEASED FATHER-INLAW BECAUSE THERE WAS OTHER EVIDENCE THAT WAS
MORE PROBATIVE ON THE POINT FOR WHICH IT WAS
OFFERED.
The trial court properly excluded from evidence the
notarized statement of defendant's deceased father-in-law, Harmon
Meinhart, because the affidavit was not admissible under the
residual hearsay exception as defendant asserts.

(Br. of

Appellant at 13). Rule 804(b)(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
states:
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A statement not specifically covered by any
of the foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness [will not be excluded] if the
court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence[.]
Defendant offered Meinhart's affidavit to demonstrate
that defendant could not have committed the June 16, 1991
burglaries in Vernal, Utah because he was in Salt Lake City that
night•

On appeal, defendant asserts:
The [trial] court, while it made no
specific ruling as to either the reliability
of the statement or the interests of justice,
did rule that other probative evidence was
available, to wit, the testimony of Clara Eva
Meinhart. Her testimony was not identical
[to] that of Mr. Meinhart in that she did not
see the defendant in Salt Lake City on the
night of June 16, 1991. She only heard the
arguments. She believed that she heard the
defendant's voice, but it was her husband who
personally went outside and talked to the
defendant. (TR. 322-340)

(Br. of Appellant at 15).
Defendant's assertion that it was Mr. Meinhart and not
.Mrs. Meinhart who personally went outside and talked to defendant
appears to be accurate.

However, defendant's claim that "[Mrs.

Meinhart] did not see the defendant in Salt Lake City on the
night of June 16, 1991;

Tslhe only heard the argumentsr,]"

plainly misstates the record.

In her testimony, Mrs. Meinhart

indicated at least five times that she personally saw defendant
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between 9:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on the date in question (R.
1143, 1144, 1150, 1154, 1155).

(For the Court's convenience,

these pages of the record are reproduced in Addendum C of the
State's brief.)

For instance, consider the following exchange

between defendant's attorney and Mrs. Meinhart:
QUESTION (by Mr. Williams): Okay.

To allay that

partially, I'm going to ask you, you said you heard them, meaning
Bill and Vickie [Horton]?
ANSWER [by Clara Eva Meinhart in her deposition, which
was read at trial by her daughter]: Yeah.

Vickie and Bill was

over there fighting.
QUESTION: Now, as far as hearing the voices, did you
hear Bill Horton's voice?
ANSWER: I seen both of them.

I didn't have to hear

them, I seen them.
QUESTION: Where did you see them?
ANSWER: They was out on the landing here, the porch
landing by the motorcycle.
QUESTION: Okay.

And how long did you see them?

ANSWER: How long?
minutes.

I stood and watched them for a few

I was so disgusted with them I just stood and watched

them.

QUESTION: Okay.

We'll leave it at that.

Now, as far

as the time that you looked out on the landing next to your home
and saw them, was that before or after the [10:00 P.M.] news?
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ANSWER: That was after the news, because I was just
getting ready to go in and go to bed and —
to go in and go to bed.

or I was just going

I went and got ready for bed and was

laying there and they was screaming and carrying on.
yelled at Harmon.

And I

And I told him, I says, get out of there and

either tell them to shut up or I am going to call the cops and
have them removed (R. 1143-45).
The inescapable conclusion is that defendant's claim is
predicated upon a misstatement of the record.

Moreover, in

addition to the testimony of Mrs. Meinhart, defendant presented
three other witnesses who testified to his whereabouts on the
night of June 16, 1991: Ray Bringhurst, a friend of defendant who
was not charged in connection with any of the burglaries; Vickie
Horton, defendant's wife; and Rochelle Schow, defendant's
stepdaughter.

With the exception of Mrs. Meinhart, all of the

alibi witnesses testified that they spent June 16, 1991, in each
others' company.

The group started the day together at

defendant's residence at about 10:00 or 10:30 in the morning.
From defendant's residence, they went up east canyon for the day.
After dusk, the group left the canyon and returned to defendant's
residence in Salt Lake City (R. 294-322).

Mrs. Meinhart

testified that she saw defendant after he returned home from the
canyon, at about 9:00 that night (R. 329).
In light of the testimony of these four alibi
witnesses, the affidavit of Harmon Meinhart was not admissible
under rule 804(b)(5) because it was not "more probative on the
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point for which it [was] offered than any other evidence which
the proponent [could] procure through reasonable efforts • . . .M
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(5) (1992) (emphasis added).

This Court

should therefore uphold the trial court's decision not to admit
the affidavit of Harmon Meinhart.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE HIS
TRIAL.
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for
a continuance. Although at first brush defendant's claim that
the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to continue the
trial so that defendant's "vital alibi witness," his mother-inlaw, could recover from surgery may hold some appeal, a closer
examination of the facts demonstrates otherwise.

(Br. of

Appellant at 16).
The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within
the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.
820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991).

State v. Oliver,

In Oliver, the defendant

moved for a continuance so a "key witness" would be allowed to
have her trial first, before testifying at defendant's trial.
Id. at 476. The Oliver Court noted that "[w]hen moving for a
continuance, a party must show that denial of the motion will
prevent the party from obtaining material and admissible
evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can be produced
within a reasonable time, and that it has exercised due diligence
29

in preparing for the case before requesting the continuance."
Id.
In the present case, defendant has failed to satisfy
the first prong of the Oliver test because he was in fact allowed
to present the evidence he wished to have admitted.

While the

State concedes that Mrs. Meinhart was unable to appear at the
scheduled trial in person because of the need to recover from
bladder surgery,7 her testimony was presented at trial through
the reading of her deposed statement (R. 1137-57).

Consequently,

defendant was not prevented from obtaining or presenting any
evidence.

Rather, he was merely limited to presenting Meinhart's

testimony by reading her deposition to the jury instead of having
her testify in person.
With respect to the second prong of Oliver, that the
witness be available within a reasonable time, it is unclear
exactly how long it would have been before Meinhart would have
been able to testify in person.

In his letter, Meinhart's

physician indicates that following her surgery Meinhart would
require "a recovery time of eight weeks due to the delicate
nature of this surgery" and that "she [would] need a complete
recovery time of a period of six months" (R. 167). Given the
wide range of recovery times indicated by Meinhart's doctor, and
the long duration of those recovery times, the trial court's
7

Defendant provided a letter from Meinhart's physician
indicating that in his opinion "it was necessary for [Meinhart]
to be excused from jury duty at this time" (R. 167). Presumably,
Meinhart's physician intended to indicate that Meinhart would be
unable to testify at trial.
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refusal to grant defendant's motion is understandable.
As for the third prong of the Oliver test, it appears
that defendant exercised due diligence in preparing his case
before requesting a continuance.

Certainly, there is nothing in

the record to suggest otherwise.
Given the facts in the record before this Court, there
is no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance.
Instead of waiting for an indefinite and likely lengthy period of
time for Meinhart to recover from her surgery so that she could
testify in person, the trial court ordered that Meinhart be
deposed and her testimony read into the record before the jury.
This was a reasonable solution to the problem presented and was
well within the trial court's discretion.

This Court should

therefore uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion
for a continuance.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW INTO EVIDENCE A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE TRUNK
OF THE CAR USED TO TRANSPORT THE STOLEN
PROPERTY.
The trial court properly refused to admit a photograph
proffered by defendant to depict the size of the trunk of the car
used to transport stolen property from the scene of the crime.8
The photograph of the vehicle's trunk was taken by
defendant's wife, Vickie Horton.
8

As a review of the photograph

The photograph in question is defendant's exhibit #25,
which is in the envelope located at page 170 in the record.
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demonstrates, it was taken from the rear of the car, looking into
the open trunk area.

Inside the trunk is a hubcap that is

leaning against the rim of the trunk. Although the hubcap was
purportedly 14 inches in diameter, there is no ruler or other
verifiable scale of measurement in the photograph.

More

importantly, the bottom portion of the hubcap and the floor of
the trunk are not visible in the photograph.

As such, there was

no way to verify the actual size of the hubcap or whether it was
resting on the floor of the trunk or some other object.
In State v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 243 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court held,
Under Rule 901(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, foundation may be laid to
authenticate evidence by testimony which
establishes that the evidence is what the
proponent claims it to be. In general, if a
competent witness with personal knowledge of
the facts represented by a photograph
testifies that the photograph accurately
reflects those facts, it is admissible.
Purcell, 711 P.2d at 245.
In this case, defendant's wife testified that the
hubcap was 14 inches in diameter and that it was resting on the
floor of the trunk.

She also testified that the floor of the

trunk was flat (R. 1125-26).
Under Purcell, it appears that the trial court could
have admitted the photograph.

However, Purcell does not stand

for the proposition that the photograph had to be admitted into
evidence.

In refusing to admit the photograph, the trial court

did not specifically explain why it would not admit the
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photograph in light of Horton's testimony.

Nevertheless, given

the context of the argument, it appears that the court was more
persuaded by the State's argument that the photograph was
unreliable than it was by the testimony of defendant's wife.
Also, defendant already had introduced without objection another
photograph of the car.

That photograph was a side-view of the

vehicle that depicted the entire car (R. 1124).

The trial court

also admitted another photograph of the car that depicted the
back seat as viewed through the driver's side door (R. 1127-28).
Finally, Vickie Horton testified that the trunk was, at most,
only nine inches deep (R. 1127).

Under the circumstances, the

trial court did not err when it refused to admit defendant's
exhibit # 2 5 .
Even if the photograph should have been admitted, the
trial court's refusal to do so was at most harmless error
because, as explained above, the jury had other evidence from
which it could determine whether the vehicle was large enough to
accommodate all of the stolen property.

See State v. Hamilton,

827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) ("'Harmless' errors are 'errors
which, although properly preserved below and presented on appeal,
are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the out come of the
proceedings.'") (citations omitted).
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POINT VI
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-401 (1990), AS
INTERPRETED BY THIS COURT IN STATE V. SWAPP,
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SENTENCING
DEFENDANT TO ONE CONCURRENT AND SEVEN
CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS THAT TOTALLED MORE
THAN THIRTY YEARS.
The trial court's imposition of a sentence with an
aggregate total of more than 30 years did not violate Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1990)-

Section 76-3-401(4) reads as follows:

"If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum
of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years' imprisonment. .
. .,f Section 76-3-401(8) clarifies that " [t]his section may not
be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the
validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length
of sentences actually served under the commitments.w

Utah Code

Ann. § 76-3-401(8) (1990) (emphasis added).
In State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115 (Utah App.)f cert,
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991), which defendant concedes is
controlling, this Court interpreted section 76-3-401 as not
precluding the imposition of consecutive sentences that total
more than thirty years, but merely restricting the actual time
served to be no more than thirty years.

Id. at 120.

In the

present case, therefore, the trial court did not violate section
76-3-401 by imposing consecutive sentences that total more than
thirty years.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of September,

1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

TODD A. UTZINGERV
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Alan M. Williams, attorney for appellant, 365 West 50 North, #W4,
Vernal, Utah

84078, this 9£j^day

of September, 1992.

(Lis d.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

vs.

:

AFFIDAVIT AND ORDER
FOR SEARCH WARRANT

:

WILLIAM GENE HORTON,

:

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

}
l

CASE NO.

:

55

COUNTY OF UINTAH }
The Affiant undersigned being sworn states on oath;;
1.

I am a peace officer in the State of Utah.

I have

been a police officer for approximately 12 years. For all of those
years I have been employed by the Vernal City Police Department.
I have been assigned to the investigative services division where
my duties there have included the investigation of various criminal
offenses.

During

my

career

I have

been

involved

in

the

investigation and/or arrests of at least 500 persons for various
crimes.
I attended

the Utah Police Academy

and

certified police officer in the State of Utah.

am currently a
During my career,

I have attended many hours of in service training which includes
training

into

the

investigation

forgeries and thefts.

of

property

related

crimes,

2.

The property for which a search warrant is sought

is described as follows: shoes/boots with matching sole prints to
attached photo's taken at two crime scenes marked as: exhibits
numbered 1, 2, and 3; cut and wrapped meat and meat products with
matching retail price tags, described as red with black lettering
various styles of print also white labels with ret trim and black
lettering.

Possibly dated packages from May 25, 26, 1991 and June

15, 16, 1991; video tape movies, vhs format labeled "Wilkerson's"
included but not limited to the following movie titles:
Criminal Justice
Lemon Sisters
The Freshman
Moon 44
Child's Play 2
Dead Reckoning
In Too Deep
Top Gun
Hoosiers
Cry Baby
Here's Mickey
Three Men and a Baby
Stand and Deliver
Huckleberry Hound
Richochet Rabbit
Good Morning Vietnam
Daredevil Ducks
Mickey's Christmas Carol
Winnie the Pooh
Mac and Me
Crocodile Dundee 2
Child's Play
Sweetheart's Dance
Things Change
Eight Men Out
Duck to the Future
Mickey and the Beanstalk
Rain Man
The January Man
Back Fire
Ironweed
Karate Kid 3

Chip-N-Dale
Bongo
You Can Fly
Nuts about Chip-n-Dale
Hi Ho Sing Along
Ben and Me
Lost World Wonders
Fun with Music Sing
The Iron Triangle
Pumkin Head
High Spirits
Physical Evidence
Who's Harry Crumb
True Believers
Heather's
Sherlock Hound
Police Academy 6
Stripped to Kill 2
Sizzle Beach USA
The Ranch
Mississippi Burning
Hamburger Hill
Tequila Sunrise
Under the Boardwalk
Hero's Stand Alone
Dino Star
A Whisper to a Scream
Pet Cemetery
The Enforcer
Long Days Journey into
Night
Northwest Passage
Uncle Buck

UHF
Pink Cadillac
Rio Grande
Billy the Kid
The Horror Show
Bambi
Moon Trap
Sing
Broadcast News
Trust Me
Working Girl
Major League
The Dream Team
Earth Girls are Easy

Sinbad of the Seven Seas
Indiana Jones the Last
Crusade
The Fighting Kentuckian
The Terror Within
The Legend of Sleepy Hollow
Farewell to the Kings
Slaves of New York
Little Big Man
976-Evil
Out of the Dark
Criminal Law
A Christmas Carol
Checking Out
Bill and Ted's Excellent
Adventure

Nintendo game cartridges, also labeled "Wilkerson's" including but
not limited to the following game titles:
Beetlejuice
Wheel of Fortune
Jack Nicklaus Golf
Sesame Street (2 copies)
Super Mario 3
Deja Vu
Total Recall
Wizards and Warriors
Vegas Dream
Spot
John Elway Quarterback
Conan the Barbarian
Metalstorm
Pal-Mania
Ghostbusters 2
Narc
Turbo Racing

Flight of the Intruder
Power Blade
Teenage
Mutant
Ninja
Turtles 2
Duck Tales
Double Dragon
Dirty Harry
Top Gun
Ski or Die
Touchdown Fever
Archrivals Basketball
Dr. Mario
Road Blaster
Days of Thunder
Yo Noid
Rad Racer
Robocop Game

numerous fishing lures, spinners, bait, fishing reels, flies and
assorted tackle, items were tagged with reddish orange price
labels. See attached invoice list from Kurt's Sport's Distributing
to Wilkerson's Inc., invoice numbers 37013 and 37014. Invoices are
marked as exhibit 4.
several dozen cartons of various brands of cigarettes, including:
Marlboro, Marlbox, Marlboro King, Marlboro Light, Camel, Camel
filter, Camel Lights, Kool, Kool 100fs, Winston, Winston Light,
Winston 100vs Salem Doral, Merits, and other brand names.

retail packages of various types of nuts, candy and jerky labeled
with reddish orange price tags.
approximately four dozen hand towels in various colors including
green, blue, pink, and yellow, all marked "Dinah Bowl" with an
outline of a dinosaur on the towel•
one Vector Two bowling ball, black in color.
13 leather hand bags, with shoulder straps.
various Cricket brand hair brushes and combs.
Membco hair combs.
Salon Essentials, nail care kits.
3.

The

grounds

for

issuing

a

search

warrant,

as

provided by Utah Code Annotated 77-23-2, are as follows: (a) the
property was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; (b)
the property is evidence of illegal conduct.
4.

I have probable cause to believe, and do believe,

that the property is located on the premises known or described
as: William Gene Horton, address 1175 North 1500 West, Salt Lake
City, Utah further described as: Red Brick, White Trim, Grey Roof, One
Car Carport, White Sided Shed North of Carport, Skylight on East side of Roof,
9 Pane Picture Window next to front door. Half Circle walkway to front door.

5.

The facts to establish the grounds for the issuance

of a search warrant are:
On the 8th day of July, 1991, your affiant received a call at
the Vernal City Police Department from a person who identified
themself and requested to remain anonymous. The person stated that
they had information regarding a burglary of the Bowling Alley in

Vernal that had recently been broken into. Your affiant confirmed
that the Bowling Alley had in fact been broken into.

The caller

then asked if a business in Duchesne had been broken into and VCR's
taken?

Your affiant was unaware of such a burglary at that time.

The caller stated that they had overheard a conversation
between Vickey and Billy Horton.

During this conversation the

caller had overheard Billy Horton say the he, Billy Horton, had
broken into the Vernal Bowling Alley.

The caller also overheard

Billy Horton say something about VCR9s from Duchesne.
The caller advised

your affiant

that the suspect, Billy

Horton, was released from the Utah State Prison about one year ago.
The suspect was described as between the ages of 35 and 38 years
of age.

The suspect drove a blue, late model Ford Mustang, Utah

License number 101 AKE, to the Vernal area to commit the crimes.
The caller further informed your affiant that the suspect had been
convicted of several burglaries in the past.

The caller also

informed your affiant that the suspect resides at 1175 North 1500
West in Salt Lake City, Utah.
After receiving the information from the caller your affiant
called the Duchesne County Sheriff's Office and spoke with Sheriff
Rick Harrison.

Sheriff Harrison confirmed that "Wilkerson's" in

Duchesne County had been broken into and missing were VCR's,
recorded VHS movies, and Nintendo game cartridges. Upon receiving
a copy of the Duchesne County Sheriff's report on the burglary of
"Wilkerson's" your affiant noted that there were numerous fishing

items taken including: tackle, rods, reels; video movies; VCR's;
Nintendo games; snack foods; and other consumables.
Your affiant was able to locate a driver's license issued to
William G. Horton of 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake City, Utah,
Further, your affiant was able to obtain a criminal history record
on William Gene Horton, DOB: 12/05/53, said criminal history
revealed several arrests and convictions for burglary and other
crimes.
At about 1300 hours on the same aforementioned date your
affiant again received a phone call from the informant.

The

informant stated that the suspect had been in possession of several
boxes of video tapes, Nintendo games, some VCR's and several boxes
of packaged meat.

The informant further stated that the suspect

had been selling lots of cartons of Marlboro cigarettes.

The

informant stated that they thought that a person from Vernal may
have been involved with the burglaries.

The informant further

stated that they would call back with that information if they were
able to obtain the same.
At about 1600 hours on the aforementioned date your affiant
received a phone call from the same informant.

The informant

stated that they thought the other suspect from Vernal was named
"Steven."

The informant further stated that the suspect lived in

Vernal and had been in prison with Billy Horton, the informant
further described

the second suspect

married with one child.

as blond, stocky build,

At approximately 2230 hours on the aforementioned date your
affiant again received a phone call from the informant.

The

informant stated that the second suspectfs name was Brian not
Steven.

The informant further relayed that Brian had just been

released from prison and that his child was approximately 6 months
old.
On the 9th day of July, 1991, your affiant contacted Brent
Cardall, Vernal Department of Corrections.

Mr. Cardall reported

that he only had two Brian's listed in his office: Brian Harris was
in California and has been for several months; Brian Winslow was
in the Utah Prison and released in March of 1990.

Mr. Cardall

described Brian Winslow as blond, stocky build, married with one
small infant approximately 6 months old.
relayed

that

Mr. Cardall further

Brian Winslow has an extensive criminal history

including the crime of burglary and other property crimes against
a person.
On the 9th day of July, 1991, at approximately 1400 hours your
affiant received a phone call from the informant.

The informant

stated that the second suspect in Vernal was named Brian Winslow.
The informant further advised your affiant that Billy Horton was
in Vernal and was staying with Brian Winslow for the next two or
three days.
Based upon the statements of the above informant your affiant
believes that at least some of the property listed above is at t
above residence.

Your affiant is not requesting a nighttime or no knock service
authorization on this warrant•

DATE SIGNED: 7//°/fi

TIME SIGNED: £>/£&

A^f

This Affidavit was sworn to be before me by Affidavit on the
date and at the time shown.

IT IS ORDERED that a search warrant be issued for the articles
and places described in the above affidavit, for an immediate
search in the daytime and upon notice.

Special
Annotated:

instruction

pursuant

to

77-23-3(2),

Utah

Code

ADDENDUM B

DISTRICT COURT
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH

PEB 141992
CK, CLERK
DEPUTY

HARRY H. SOUVALL #4919
Uintah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
152 East 100 North
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 781-0770
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF UINTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
:

WILLIAM GENE HORTON,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH WARRANT
AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

:
CASE NO. 911800036 FS

Defendant.

:

This matter came before the Court on the 7th day of
November, 1991 on Defendant's Motion To Quash Warrant and Exclude
Evidence.

The Plaintiff was represented by Harry Souvall, Uintah

County Attorney.

The Defendant was present and represented by

counsel, Alan M. Williams.

Also present was Defendant, Dennis

Session, who was represented by his attorney, Keith Chiara.

The

Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses and the
arguments of counsel, and being fully apprised thereof issues the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the

action, as this is a Motion To Suppress filed pursuant to Rule
12,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2.

On or about the 16th day of June, 1991, the Dinah Bowl

Bowling Alley in Vernal and two shops located therein, The Acute
Cut and The Dinah Barber Salon, were also broken into and thefts
occurred in each of the respective businesses.
3.

On or about July 8, 1991, Detective Joe Boren of the

Vernal City Police Department, received a phone call from a
confidential informant, who asked not to be identified.

This

informant stated to Officer Boren that they had information
regarding the burglary of the bowling alley in Vernal, which had
recently been broken into.

The caller then asked if a business

in Duchesne had been broken into, where VCR's had been taken.
Detective Boren testified that the caller stated that he or she
had overheard a conversation between Vickie and Billy Horton.
During this conversation, the caller overheard Billy Horton say
that he had broken into the Vernal bowling alley.

The caller

also overheard Billy Horton say something about VCR's from
Duchesne.

The caller then advised Detective Boren that the

suspect, Billy Horton, was released from the Utah State Prison
2

about one year ago. The suspect was described as being between
the ages of 35 and 38. The suspect drove a blue, late model Ford
Mustang, Utah License Number 101AKE, to the Vernal area to commit
the crimes.

The caller further informed Detective Boren that

the suspect had been convicted of several burglaries in the past.
The caller further informed Officer Boren that the suspect
resides at 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake City, Utah.
4.

Detective Boren was able to locate a drivers license

issued to William G. Horton of 1175 North 1500 West in Salt Lake
City, Utah.

Detective Boren was also able to obtain a criminal

history on William Gene Horton and said criminal history revealed
several arrests and convictions for burglary and other crimes.
5.

Detective Boren further testified that later on the same

day, he received a phone call from the informant.

The informant

stated the suspect had been in possession of several boxes of
video tapes, Nintendo games, some VCRfs and several boxes of
packaged meat.

The informant further stated that the suspect had

been selling lots of cartons of Marlboro cigarettes.

The

informant stated that they thought that a person from Vernal may
have been involved with the burglaries and stated that they would
call back with information if they were able to obtain the same.
6.

Detective Boren further testified that about three hours

later, also on July 8, 1991, he received another call from the
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same informant.

The informant stated that they thought the other

suspect was named Steven.

The informant further stated that the

suspect lived in Vernal and had been in prison with Billy Horton.
The informant further described the second suspect as "blonde,
stocky build, married with one child".
7.

Detective Boren testified that at approximately 22:30

hours on the aforementioned date, he received another phone call
from the informant.

The informant stated the second suspect's

name was Brian - not Steven.

The informant further stated that

Brian had been released from prison and his child was
approximately six months old.
8.

On or about the 9th day of July, 1991, Officer Boren

contacted Brent Cardall of the Department of Corrections.
Cardall reported that he only had two Brians listed in his office
- Brian Harris from California and Brian Winslow.

Brian Winslow

had been in the Utah State Prison and had been released in March
of 1990.

Brent Cardall described Brian Winslow as "blonde,

stocky build and having one child approximately six months old".
Mr. Cardall further relayed that Brian Winslow had an extensive
criminal history, including the crime of burglary and other
property crimes against a person.
9.

On July 9, 1991, at approximately 14:00 hours, Officer

Boren received a call from the informant.
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The informant stated

that the second suspect in Vernal was named Brian Winslow.

The

informant further advised Officer Boren that Billy Horton was in
Vernal and was staying with Winslow for the next two or three
days.
10.

Based upon the above information, Officer Boren

obtained a Search Warrant on the 10th day of July from the Third
Circuit Court in Salt Lake County and from the Eighth Circuit
Court in Vernal to search the homes of William Gene Horton and
Brian Winslow.

The search of William Horton's home uncovered

evidence that appeared to have been taken from Dinah Bowl, The
Acute Cut, and Wilkerson's in Duchesne.
11.

After being read his Miranda rights, Co-Defendant,

Brian Winslow, confessed to the crimes and implicated the
Defendant, William Horton, Dennis Sessions and Vickie Horton as
participants in either the first set of burglaries on May 26,
1991 and the second set of burglaries on June 15, 1991 and June
16, 1991. Mr. Winslow1s confession and information regarding Mr.
Hortonfs involvement in the crime were received by the officer
after the warrant had been executed on the Horton residence
12.

Detective Boren states that he had information from the

informant that the items identified as stolen property were seen
in the driveway of the William Horton residence, but he failed to

5

include that information in the Affidavit of Probable Cause to
obtain the Search Warrant for the residence of William G. Horton.
13.

At the Hearing, Officer Boren testified that the reason

this information was not included was that the specific place and
time of when the property was seen in the driveway could have
been used to identify the informant if the Defendant had that
information.

Therefore, the fact that the stolen property was

seen in the driveway of William Horton1s residence was excluded
from the Affidavit.
14.

Officer Boren is an experienced officer with the search

warrant process.

He has drafted or assisted in the drafting of

at least two hundred search warrant affidavits.

He is familiar

with the requirements for stating in the affidavit the location
of the suspected contraband, and the factual basis for the
request to search in that location.

Officer Boren knew that he

had left out that information in his affidavit.
15.

Officer Boren invited several officers who were

investigating burglaries, which were not mentioned in the search
warrant, to accompany him in the execution of the search warrant
knowing that each officer's purpose was to search for items from
those unrelated and unidentified burglaries.

Officer Boren

allowed this despite his knowledge that there was nothing in his
affidavit or warrant that mentioned those burglaries.
6

16.

Officer Boren included, in his list of suspected

contraband attached to his affidavit, several items which had
been taken during burglaries other than the ones described in the
affidavit.
17.

Officer Boren withheld information which he had

concerning the relationship of the informer to the defendant
which may have had substantial impact on the determination of the
credibility of that informant.

He also withheld other details

given to him by the informant.
18.

While Officer Boren had information which stated that

contraband had been seen in the driveway of the Horton residence,
he did not present any evidence as to when that evidence was seen
nor if it was still there.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Affidavit in support of the warrant did not contain

information as to why the property seized would be found at the
William G. Horton residence and, therefore, there was
insufficient probable cause, is a matter of law, to establish a
probable cause for a search.
2.

The information received from the informant is

sufficiently reliable and was verified by Officer Boren to be
relied upon in the issuance of a warrant.

7

Furthermore, there was

sufficient probable cause, based upon the information, to believe
that William G. Horton had committed the crimes.
3.

Officer Boren withheld the necessary information to

establish a nexus between the crime and the stolen property being
at his residence because he was attempting to protect the
identification of an informant.

Had the information been

included in the affidavit, there would have been sufficient
probable cause to search the residence.

The officer was acting

in good faith in the request for a warrant and the execution of
the warrant and the Court upholds the search under the Good Faith
Exception

search rule requirement established by the United

States Supreme Court in The United States v. Leon.
DATED this /%#day of February, 1992.

(V^*^<^DENNIS L. DRANEY
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM C

"ANSWER:

MY GRANDDAUGHTER COME OVER AND

"MR. SOUVALL:

OBJECTION, BEFORE YOU ANSWER THAT

QUESTION, MRS. MEINHART, BECAUSE THERE IS GOING TO BE A COURT
~

THIS IS GOING TO BE READ IN COURT, I NEED TO ENSURE THAT WE

HAVE ADEQUATE FOUNDATION.

I'M GOING TO MAKE AN OBJECTION FOR

THE RECORD, FIRST OF ALL, FOR FOUNDATIONAL PURPOSES ON HOW YOU
KNEW THAT THEY WERE OVER THERE, BECAUSE WE REALLY HAVEN'T
HEARD THAT YET."
"THE WITNESS:

HOW THEY WAS OVER WHERE?"

"MR. SOUVALL:

AND SECONDLY, ANYTHING THAT YOUR

GRANDDAUGHTER WAS TO SAY, I'M GOING TO OBJECT ON THE GROUNDS
THAT IT'S HEARSAY.

IN OTHER WORDS, IT'S WORDS OUT OF HER

MOUTH THAT YOU'RE GOING TO TELL US, NOT YOUR OBSERVATIONS."
"QUESTION:

(BY MR. WILLIAMS)

OKAY.

TO ALLAY THAT

PARTIALLY, I'M GOING TO ASK YOU, YOU SAID YOU HEARD THEM,
MEANING BILL AND VICKIE?"
"ANSWER:

YEAH.

VICKIE AND BILLY WAS OVER THERE

FIGHTING."
"QUESTION:

NOW, AS FAR AS HEARING THE VOICES, DID

YOU HEAR BILL HORTON'S VOICE?"
"ANSWER:

I SEEN BOTH OF THEM.

I DIDN'T HAVE TO

HEAR THEM, I SEEN THEM."
"QUESTION:
"ANSWER:

WHERE DID YOU SEE THEM?"

THEY WAS OUT ON THE LANDING HERE, THE

PORCH LANDING BY THE MOTORCYCLE."
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COMPUTERIZED TRANRPRTPT

1

"QUESTION:

2

"ANSWER:

3

FEW MINUTES.

4

WATCHED THEM."

5

I STOOD AND WATCHED THEM FOR A

I WAS SO DISGUSTED WITH THEM I JUST STOOD AND

NOW, YOU SAID IT WAS BETWEEN 10:00 AND

11:00 THAT NIGHT?"

7

"ANSWER:

8

THEM AND THAT.

9

11:00.

10

HOME."

11

WELL, IT WAS A LITTLE EARLIER THAT I SEEN

WHEN I WENT TO BED, IT WAS BETWEEN 10:00 AND

IT WAS ABOUT 9:00 THAT T NOTICED THAT THEY HAD COME

"QUESTION:

12

AND HOW LONG DID YOU SEE THEM?"

HOW LONG?

"QUESTION:

6 1

OKAY.

OKAY.

NOW, HOW DID YOU FIX THE 9:00

TIME FRAME AS YOU LOOK BACK IN YOUR MIND?"

13

"ANSWER:

BECAUSE ~

14

WHAT ~

15

THAT, AND THAT COMES ON AROUND 10:00. THEN WE WENT —

16

IN AND GOT THINGS READY.

17

IN, RACHELLE, MY GRANDDAUGHTER, AND WAS VERY UPSET, WHICH SHE

18

WILL BE THERE TO TESTIFY.

19

I KNOW THAT I WATCHED ~

HONESTLY, I CAN'T REMEMBER

"QUESTION:

20

I ALWAYS WATCHED THE NEWS AND
I WENT

WELL, LIKE I AM SAYING, ROCKY CAME

AND

DID YOU HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH ROCKY

ABOUT WHAT HAD GONE ON DURING THAT DAY?"

21

"ANSWER:

YES."

22

"QUESTION:

OKAY.

WE'LL LEAVE IT AT THAT.

NOW, AS

23

FAR AS THE TIME THAT YOU LOOKED OUT ON THE LANDING NEXT TO

24

YOUR HOME AND SAW THEM, WAS THAT BEFORE OR AFTER THE NEWS?"

25

"ANSWER:

THAT WAS AFTER THE NEWS, BECAUSE I WAS
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COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

"ANSWER:

UH-HUH."

"QUESTION:

OKAY.

NOW, MRS. MEINHART, VICKIE IS

YOUR DAUGHTER; IS THAT CORRECT?"
"ANSWER:

RIGHT."

"QUESTION:

YOU'RE AWARE THAT VICKIE HAS BEEN

CHARGED IN THESE BURGLARIES EVEN THOUGH SHE WOULD BE TRIED
SEPARATELY FROM WILLIAM?"
"ANSWER:

UH-HUH."

"QUESTION:

YOU ALSO ARE AWARE, THEN, THAT YOUR

TESTIMONY TODAY IN FAVOR OF MR. HORTON IS ALSO REGARDING HIS
ALIBI AND WILL BE USED TO PROVIDE HER AN ALIBI AS WELL?"
"ANSWER:

THAT'S RIGHT."

"QUESTION:

ON THE EVENING IN QUESTION, WHAT WAS

THE EXACT TIME YOU SAW BILLY AND VICKIE ARGUING?"
"ANSWER:

THIS WAS —

NOW, JUST A MINUTE, RESTATE

THAT SO I KNOW JUST WHAT YOU ARE SAYING."
"QUESTION:

OKAY.

YOU TESTIFIED THAT YOU SAW THEM

OUT ON THE LANDING, I BELIEVE IS THE TERM YOU USED, AND THEY
WERE ARGUING?"
"ANSWER:

YEAH."

"QUESTION:

AND THAT YOU NOT ONLY HEARD THEM, BUT

YOU ACTUALLY SAW THEM?"
"ANSWER:

YES."

"QUESTION:
"ANSWER:

NOW, WHAT TIME DID YOU SEE THEM?"

WHAT TIME DID I SEE THEM?"
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"ANSWER:

NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

ONLY YOU FOLKS THAT

HAVE CONTACTED ME."
"QUESTION:

OKAY.

WHAT 7-ELEVEN IS IT THAT YOU

WORK AT?"
"ANSWER:

ON 13TH NORTH AND REDWOOD ROAD."

"QUESTION:

AND WHAT'S THE NAME OF YOUR DAUGHTER

WHO CAME OVER HERE ON THE 16TH?"
"ANSWER:

THAT WAS LINDA ANDERSON."

"QUESTION:

FROM 9:00, ROUGHLY, WHEN YOU SAW THE

ARGUMENT UNTIL 4:30 THE NEXT MORNING, DID YOU ACTUALLY SEE
EITHER VICKIE OR BILL?"
"ANSWER:

WITH THE ARGUMENT?"

"QUESTION:

FROM THE TIME YOU SAW THEM ARGUING,

WHICH YOU SAID WAS AROUND 9:00, UNTIL YOU SAW THEM, SAW VICKIE
AT 4:30, 5:30 IN THE MORNING ACTUALLY, I BELIEVE?"
"ANSWER:

I SEEN THEM AT —

BEFORE I WENT TO BED,

THAT WAS AT 10:30."
"QUESTION:
"ANSWER:

OKAY."

WHEN THE NEWS WENT OFF, AROUND THAT TIME

BETWEEN 10:00 AND 11:00, I WENT AND LOOKED OUT THERE.
WAS WAS VERY DISGUSTED.

I WENT INTO BED AND THAT.

AND I

AND THE

NOISE PROCEEDED, AND THAT'S WHEN I HOLLERED AT MY HUSBAND,
HARMON, TO COME IN.
DO SOMETHING.

I TOLD HIM HE BETTER GET OVER THERE AND

AND THAT WAS THE LAST I SEEN ANY OF THEM UNTIL

WHEN I GOT UP AT 4:30.

KNOW THE THING WAS ON AND BETWEEN 5:30
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AND QUARTER TO 6:00, I WOULD GO OVER AND KNOCK ON THE DOOR AND
WAKE ONE OF THESE KIDS UP TO LET THEM KNOW I WAS ON MY WAY OR
I WAS LEAVING TO GO TO WORK."
"MR. SOUVALL:
"QUESTION:

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS."

(BY MR. WILLIAMS)

THING, MRS. MEINHART, THEY CAME —

JUST TO RECAP THIS

TO YOUR RECOLLECTION, THEY

CAME HOME ABOUT 9:00?"
"ANSWER:

UH-HUH."

"QUESTION:

AND YOU SAW THEM OUT ON THE LANDING

BETWEEN YOUR HOME AND THE HOME NEXT DOOR WHERE THE? LIVED?"
"ANSWER:

YEAH."

"QUESTION:

AND BY "THEY", WE'RE TALKING ABOUT BILL

AND VICKIE AND JAY AND SOMEONE ELSE?"
"ANSWER:

RIGHT, AND THE KIDS."

"QUESTION:

AND AT ABOUT 10:30, THE NEWS WAS OVER

AND YOU LOOKED OVER?"
"ANSWER:

RIGHT."

"QUESTION:
"ANSWER:

YOU WENT TO BED?"

YES."

"QUESTION:

AND SHORTLY AFTER OR SOMETIME

THEREAFTER YOU SENT YOUR HUSBAND OUT TO QUIET THINGS DOWN?"
"ANSWER:

RIGHT."

"QUESTION:

AND ALL OF THOSE FOUR PEOPLE WERE

ARGUING UNTIL YOUR HUSBAND GOT THEM QUIETED DOWN?"
"ANSWER:

RIGHT."
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